Scientific discovery reloaded by Ippoliti, Emiliano
     













© Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2017
Abstract
The way scientific discovery has been conceptualized has changed drastically in the last few decades: its relation to logic, 
inference, methods, and evolution has been deeply reloaded. The ‘philosophical matrix’ moulded by logical empiricism and 
analytical tradition has been challenged by the ‘friends of discovery’, who opened up the way to a rational investigation of 
discovery. This has produced not only new theories of discovery (like the deductive, cognitive, and evolutionary), but also 
new ways of practicing it in a rational and more systematic way. Ampliative rules, methods, heuristic procedures and even a 
logic of discovery have been investigated, extracted, reconstructed and refined. The outcome is a ‘scientific discovery revo-
lution’: not only a new way of looking at discovery, but also a construction of tools that can guide us to discover something 
new. This is a very important contribution of philosophy of science to science, as it puts the former in a position not only to 
interpret what scientists do, but also to provide and improve tools that they can employ in their activity.
Keywords Logic · Discovery · Heuristics · Reasoning · Psychology · Algorithm
1  Scientific Discovery: The Matrix
A long-standing and influential tradition has shaped the way 
scientific discovery has been accounted for. It has been put 
forward in particular by logical empiricism, mathemati-
cal logic and the analytical tradition in philosophy, which 
moulded the matrix, that is, the origin and the conceptual 
framework, of the received theory of scientific discovery. 
It simply maintains that there is no way of accounting for 
scientific discovery in logical or even rational terms: “there 
is no such thing as a logical method of having new ideas, or 
a logical reconstruction of this process. […] every discovery 
contains an ‘irrational element,’ or ‘a creative intuition,’ in 
Bergson’s sense” (Popper 1961, 32). This idea, which opens 
up the way to the ‘psychology of discovery’, breaks down 
into two approaches.
The first argues that scientific discovery is a black box: 
the final hypothesis is the only thing that we can see, and 
this is the outcome of a subjective, idiosyncratic, completely 
personal process and, as such, it cannot be reconstructed by 
rational means: “there are extraordinary aspects of the per-
son who is able to produce significant new works” (Weisberg 
2006, xii), and they are essential for discovery. Genius (see 
e.g. Murray 1989), illumination, ‘faculties’ such as intui-
tion, insight, or ‘divergent thinking’, are common notions 
employed to support this thesis. Even if this line of argu-
ment ends up with a obscurum per obscurius, in principle 
that is not a problem: the whole process of discovery does 
not matter so much since what philosophy and science can 
reasonably do is evaluate a hypothesis only after it has been 
generated—since generation and justification are logically, 
temporally and in methods separated. This line of argument 
is maintained by famous philosophers like Popper (1961) 
and Laudan (1977, 1981) as well as scientists like Einstein 
(1958) and Frege (1960).
The second approach argues that even if discovery is a 
matter of psychology, we can understand it and account for 
several properties of it. This view has been popularized by 
Poincaré (1908), and refined and extended by Wallas (1926), 
Hadamard (1958) and Simonton (1988). Wallas made 
explicit the stages of the process of discovery discussed 
only informally by Poincaré, while “Hadamard marshaled 
additional evidence for the theory of unconscious processing 
and tried to demonstrate the wide role of such processing in 
other areas of cognition” (Weisberg 2006, 398–399). A typi-
cal example used to support this idea is Kekulé’s discovery 
of benzene structure (Kekulé’s dream). While somnolent in 
front of his fireplace, August Kekulé had a vision of atoms 
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dancing one after the other and then, later, of a snake biting 
its tail (forming a ring). It was this dream that revealed the 
real structure of the benzene ring to the German chemist, 
according to his own report.
To provide more detail, this second viewpoint, in turn, 
breaks down into two branches. The separation is about the 
nature of mental processes, the conscious and unconscious 
ones, which are involved in the generation of hypotheses 
during the search for the solution to a problem.
A first branch maintains that conscious and unconscious 
processes are of the same kind: they are ‘homogeneous’ and 
they only differ in the way data-processing is performed. The 
conscious mind works in a serial way, while the unconscious 
works in a parallel way. Poincaré supported this idea, which 
is labeled parallelism.
By contrast, a second viewpoint states that the two men-
tal processes are heterogeneous, they are different in kind 
and cannot be reduced one to the other. This hypothesis is 
labeled associationism and is supported by Freud and his 
followers.
In more detail, unconscious thought and its relation to 
conscious thought is approached along two dimensions:
(1) the nature of the links that connect one unconscious 
thought to the next one. A link can employ the same 
processes as the conscious one or not. In the former 
case we have a homogeneity between conscious and 
unconscious thoughts, in the latter a heterogeneity.
(2) whether the stream of thoughts are parallel, in the sense 
that you can process multiple ideas at the same time, or 
serial.
Combining these two dimensions, which are not mutu-
ally exclusive, we obtain several possible approaches to the 
mental processes underlying the generation of hypotheses 
(see Table 1).
Two of them, parallelism and associationism, as stated 
above, are particularly interesting for the psychologistic 
approach to scientific discovery.
The first conception states that unconscious processes are 
parallel and that they involve the same links as the conscious 
ones. The only difference is quantitative, i.e. speed, as an 
outcome of parallelism: unconscious thought is much faster. 
Since the links that enable us to connect an idea to another 
are the same for conscious and unconscious processes, it fol-
lows that once the hypothesis has been generated, the person 
who produced it is in a position, in principle, to understand 
how it came out: “the unconscious does not do anything that 
conscious processing could not do if there were but time 
available” (Weisberg 2006, 395).
The second branch maintains that the links created by 
unconscious thought are different from those of conscious 
thought. That is, unconscious processing can generate 
associative links for reasons of which one is not aware and 
perhaps could not be. The difference is qualitative. So “a 
creative leap can come about because (1) the processing 
has occurred on an unconscious level, which results in the 
thinker’s being surprised by the sudden leap; and (2) the 
leap is based on connections that the person could never 
think of using conscious thought, which is a second source 
of surprise” (Ibid., 389).1
The psychology of scientific discovery has been refined 
several times (see for example Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyer 
1995) and also popularized in movies and novels. An exami-
nation of all the different versions of it is beyond the goals of 
this paper. Its ‘philosophical matrix’ is clear enough. What 
is more interesting to discuss here are the several, critical 
weaknesses that the whole idea of a psychology of discovery 
faces. I will examine in particular two main problems:
1. the sources employed to extract the mental processes;
2. multiple discovery.
1. The source of traditional psychology of discovery and 
its findings is introspection, which is a conscious recon-
struction of an unconscious process (the generation of 
a hypothesis to solve a problem). More specifically the 
pieces of evidence used in this case are auto-reports and 
interviews—such as the ones provided by Poincaré and 
Kekulé. But auto-reports and interviews are sources hard 
to trust. They are provided by individuals who “have 
developed their own theories of creative thinking that 
rely on the opportunity for unconscious processing” 
(Weisberg 2006, 429). Furthermore “the interviews pro-
vide evidence of the role of unconscious processing in 
producing illuminations”, but “the empirical support for 
the idea of unconscious processing in creative thinking 
consists of a number of anecdotal reports” (Ibid.).
  Auto-reports and interviews not only are fragmentary 
and anecdotal, but they also imply “that this particular 
Table 1  Kinds of  mental processes underlying the generation of 
hypotheses
Parallel Serial
Conscious Unconscious Conscious Unconscious
Same x Parallelism (Poin-
caré)
Poincaré x
Different x Associationism 
(Freud)
x x
1 This theory, which of course stems from Freud, is a version of the 
out-of-mind view, as the person has no conscious awareness of, or 
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aspect of discovery is not available to the awareness of 
the discoverer, and hence that the discoverer cannot be 
a source of a reliable description of the process that pro-
duced the sudden image. It does not in any way imply 
that the process is fundamentally different from other 
processes of discovery—only that we must seek for 
other sources of evidence about its nature” (Simon et 
al. 1987, 328–329).
  Bottom line: auto-reports and interviews “are not 
adequate grounds on which to build a scientific theory 
of creative thinking” (Weisberg 2006, 429) and they are 
“the unwarranted source of a great deal of mysticism 
about the discovery process. In particular, the subcon-
scious nature of the process is a red herring” (Simon et 
al. 1987, 329).
2. A psychology of discovery does not adequately account 
for multiple discovery (or simultaneous discovery, see 
e.g. Lamb and Easton 1984) and neglects the role of 
the cumulative, collective construction of hypotheses to 
solve problems.
  A multiple discovery happens when scientists working 
independently of each other achieve the same discov-
ery at about the same time. History of science contains 
plenty of this kind of discoveries: the formulation of cal-
culus by Isaac Newton and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, 
and the discovery of oxygen by Carl Wilhelz Scheele 
and Joseph Priestley, Antoine Lavoisier (and others) are 
probably the most recognized examples.
  Multiple discoveries are a problem for a psychologis-
tic approach: if a discovery is the outcome of personal, 
intra-psychic, and unconscious factors, it becomes hard 
to explain how different researchers working indepen-
dently can discover the same thing more or less at the 
same time. As a matter of fact an explanation of this 
specific, but non-rare, kind of discovery requires an 
analysis of the role of concepts such as ‘zeitgeist’, shared 
knowledge, theories and data, which are not reducible 
to an individual psychology of discovery: “if there is a 
common world picture shared by the members of the 
scientific community, certain discoveries are inevitable 
since these discoveries are ‘in the air.’ Consequently, 
several scientists who share the common repertoire of 
ideas and try to solve the same problem may arrive at 
similar solutions” (Kantorovich 1993, 186). Since the 
list of multiple discoveries is too long to be dismissed, 
this approach cannot provide an adequate account of sci-
entific discovery.
  Moreover, “the discovery process typically is struc-
tured in time rather than being a momentary psychologi-
cal experience of the solution popping into someone’s 
head” (Nickles 1981, 87) and, in addition “personally, 
a scientist may make very few scientific discoveries, if 
any, during his lifetime; most scientific discoveries are 
products of collective efforts. […] If the process extends 
over a long period of time, only the final step in the 
process is regarded as a discovery. Yet the contributions 
of the other participants are sometimes no less impor-
tant than the contribution which constituted the break-
through” (Kantorovich 1993, 12).
  Bottom line: the psychology of discovery argues that 
not only is there no logic of discovery, but also that no 
method is possible for it, no inferential way, and the 
entire approach relies on the static, a-temporal and 
obscure concept of intuition.
  But many problems of a psychology of discovery 
can be answered by simply noting that reasoning, argu-
mentation and inferences play a decisive role in the 
process of discovery. These are rational means that 
can be applied to several problems and, as such, will 
often produce the same, or very similar, conclusions. 
No surprise then, for instance, for multiple discovery: 
“in normal science scientists who start from the same 
transparent presuppositions and employ the same theory 
and observational data would arrive at the same result” 
(Ibid., 186–187).
  These and other open problems in the philosophical 
matrix of discovery made necessary a deep rethinking 
and reloading of it.
2  Reloading Scientific Discovery
The matrix incepted by logical empiricism and mathemati-
cal logic has been reset and then reloaded in several ways. 
New approaches have been developed by questioning some 
of its tenets (like the separation between context of dis-
covery and context of justification see in particular Shel-
ley 2003) and by reconsidering not only the possibility and 
meaning of a logic of discovery (Hanson 1958, Simon 1987; 
Nickles 1985; Cellucci 2013), but also the role played by 
logic, method, inferences and even evolution in scientific 
discovery (see in particular Nickles 1980a, b; Meheus and 
Nickles 2009; Clement 2008; Cellucci 2013, 2017; Gro-
sholz 2007; Grosholz and Breger 2000, Ippoliti and Cellucci 
2016; Nersessian 2008). I will examine three of them—the 
deductive (§ 2.1), the cognitive (§ 2.2) and the evolutionary 
approach (§ 2.3)2—and then I will show how the rethink-
ing triggered by these approaches, and their lessons, made 
2 This examination is not intended to be exhaustive: it analyses a few 
representative works of approaches that eased a new way of account-
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possible a new theory and practice of scientific discovery—
a ‘scientific discovery revolution’ (§ 3).
2.1  Deductive Reloading
One way of reloading the problem of scientific discovery is 
the deductive one. It simply maintains that there is some-
thing like a logic of discovery, and this is just deductive 
logic. Of course this idea faces a straightforward objection. 
Since deductive inference and reasoning are non-ampliative, 
meaning that the content of their conclusion is contained 
in the premises,3 nothing new can be inferred from them. 
Thus, nothing new can be obtained from their application: 
the function of deductions is to make explicit in the conclu-
sion pieces of information that are only implicitly contained 
in the premises. A deduction allows us rewrite the informa-
tion embedded in the axioms in a way that is much more 
understandable and testable but, from a logical viewpoint, 
it cannot extend them: at most it is a way to establish new 
logical relations between known findings, but it cannot pro-
duce new findings.
A response to this objection shapes the deductive view 
of discovery (see in particular Musgrave 1988, 1989; Zahar 
1983, 1989).
First, a well-known line of argument of the deductive 
approach teases apart logical and psychological novelty 
(see also Ippoliti 2014 on this point). It argues that even if 
a deduction cannot be ampliative from a logical viewpoint, 
it is ampliative from a psychological viewpoint: by deduc-
ing consequences we gain genuine new knowledge since the 
truth of our premises, or postulates, is not enough to foresee 
the truth of their consequences. We need an effort to obtain a 
deductive conclusion from given premises or postulates—to 
choose and combine the premises in the appropriate way—
and thus a deductive consequence is new knowledge. The 
deductive approach supports this claim with several argu-
ments, such as the semi-decidability of the theories, the 
surprise of unexpected consequences, the need of new indi-
viduals in deduction, and the epistemic aspect of conclusions 
(see e.g. Dummett 1991; Hintikka 1973; Rota 1997).
A second line of argument of the deductive approach 
argues that deductive reasoning provides a logic of discov-
ery since it is possible to rebuild ampliative inferences, such 
as induction and analogy, in terms of deductive arguments. 
In more detail, ampliative inferences can be reconstructed 
as deductive inferences with suppressed premises (a kind of 
enthymeme).
An inductive inference, argues Musgrave (1989), can be 
rebuilt as a deduction with suppressed premises in the fol-
lowing way. Let us take for example the following inductive 
argument I1:
In stating such an inductive hypothesis we are not walking 
in dark. As a matter of fact, we move from a certain assump-
tion, such as “all ravens have some common color”  (p1). Of 
course, such an assumption is domain-specific and expresses 
common beliefs about our experience in a specific niche. In 
turn, the assumption  p1 can be obtained from another, more 
general premise p* such as “ravens belong to a family of 
kinds of birds whose members have a common color”. When 
another premise,  p2 “a particular raven is black”, is added 
(of course  p2 is drawn from observation), then we have the 
following deductive argument D1:
So, I1 can be converted into D1 by introducing some 
appropriate assumptions or premises like  pl or p*. The con-
clusion of an inductive argument I1 at this point does not 
constitute a novelty with respect to the premises pl and p2 
and follows necessarily from the them.
The same holds for analogy. An analogical inference, 
argues Musgrave, can be rebuilt as a deduction with sup-
pressed premises in the following way. Let us take for exam-
ple the following analogical argument A1, the Watson argu-
ment for the structure of DNA:
DNA has a chemical composition analogous to TMV 
(tobacco mosaic virus)
TMV has a form of nucleic acid as a major chemical 
constituent
A1 can be converted into a deductive argument D2 in the 
following way:
The same (similar) effects have the same (similar) causes
The chemical composition of the DNA and TMV are 
similar
The structure of a TMV follows from its chemical 
composition
In this way we have a method of discovery based on 
deductive logic (a ‘deductive heuristics’): we discover some-
thing by starting with a hypothesis that is plausible and then 
A particular raven is black
All ravens are black
All ravens have some common color
A particular raven is black
All ravens are black
The TMV molecules are helical in structure
The DNA molecule is helical in structure
The TMV molecule is helical in structure
The DNA molecule is structurally similar to TMV (helical in structure)
3 A dedutive inference is obtained by using primitive rules whereby 
the content of their conclusion is literally included in their premises. 
A stock example is modus ponens (A, A → B ∴ B)—B is literally 
part of the second premise. Thus a deductive reasoning, as a chain of 
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deducing consequences from it. In this sense, successful sci-
entists are ones that employ the right assumptions, and a 
discovery is a deductive consequence of these assumptions 
(that are different from the ones employed by his colleagues 
at that time).
So, content-specific, suppressed assumptions are the key 
to scientific discovery and deductive reasoning is the neces-
sary addition to them. In a sense, it is not a surprise, as the 
pivotal role of suppressed (or tacit) assumptions in scientific 
reasoning has been explicitly stated and examined (see e.g. 
Polanyi 1966).
On one hand, the presence of domain-specific suppressed 
premises in scientific reasoning would explain not only why 
it is often difficult for non-experts to understand what is 
going on inside a field of expertise, but also why the experts, 
have difficulties in explaining to non-expert their reasoning. 
These premises are invisible, or transparent, to experts as 
they employ them implicitly. They are not aware of them, 
they work as if such assumptions were self-evident, and con-
tinually use them to fill the gaps in their inferential activity.
On the other hand, the fact that scientific reasoning is full 
of domain-specific, tacit premises allows us to explain part 
of the process of generation and selection of hypotheses in 
problem-solving. These assumptions are used to fill some 
gaps in their inferential activity and are means to integrate 
the data and knowledge involved in the problem and in this 
sense they shape the construction and selection of hypoth-
eses—for example they narrow the range of possible hypoth-
eses to be pursued. As a consequence, tacit premises offer a 
possible solution to the problem of under-determination. In 
effect, in trying to solve a problem, scientists do not have to 
choose between infinite logically possible hypotheses since 
this range is narrowed to only a few hypotheses by these 
suppressed, invisible assumptions.
Thus, suppressed assumptions play a pivotal role also in 
the way the deductive approach reloads the issue of scientific 
discovery in relation to methods, inference, and logic. In 
effect, there is no need for creativity, intuition, or genius to 
explain scientific discovery. To sum up:
logical empiricist orthodoxy is wrong: there is a logic 
as well as a psychology of invention, and there is a 
psychology as well as a logic of appraisal. Moreover, 
the logic of invention is best regarded as deductive 
logic. Finally, logical empiricist orthodoxy is also 
wrong to say that the context of invention is irrelevant 
to the context of appraisal. Consideration of inventive 
arguments yields minimal plausibility appraisals, and 
it also can tell us which facts are novel for the theory 
being considered (Musgrave 1989, 32).
Even if the deductive approach shows that at least in part 
the process of discovery can be accounted for in rational and 
logical terms, the idea of “deductive heuristics” as a logic of 
discovery is unsatisfactory.
As concerns the first line of argument, the distinction 
between logical and psychological novelty, the arguments 
put forward to support it do not work: not only is there no 
way to logically extend our knowledge by means of deduc-
tions from axioms but also in principle is there no need of 
any work, or effort, to get deductive consequences from a 
set of axioms, as this could be done in a mechanical way 
by using a brute force-exhaustive procedure, for instance 
the British Museum Algorithm (Newell et al. 1958). Such 
an algorithm would generate all the theorems from a set 
of premises, starting from the shorter up to the more com-
plex ones. Even if computationally ineffective, it would not 
require any intellectual work.
As concerns the second line of argument, i.e. role of 
deductive heuristics, it does not account for a crucial step 
in discovery, that is generation of hypotheses (see Ippoliti 
2017a). It does not tell us how to get premises to use to 
derive interesting results. In addition, a deductive heuris-
tics can be applied only when concepts or properties are 
already known and available: it is not a way for generat-
ing new ones. Moreover, a deductive heuristics is a recon-
struction in a deductive fashion of something that has been 
obtained in a different way. Thus, in order to be effective it 
needs a vantage point, i.e. the knowledge of the final result: 
“this is a typical example of how a process of discovery can 
be reconstructed without giving us a clue as to the method 
which might have led the discoverer to his discovery prior 
to his actually making the discovery” (Kantorovich 1994, 
8). In addition the fact that a pieces of reasoning can be re-
built in a deductive way, does not remove the uncertainty in 
that reasoning, which is simply moved to its premises. And 
deductive reasoning does not and cannot justify its premises.
Of course the fact that deductive reasoning cannot 
account for the process of discovery does not imply that it 
is useless, but simply that the generation of a hypothesis—a 
crucial step in discovery—cannot be reduced to a deduction 
(on this point see also Cellucci 2013; Ippoliti 2017b).
2.2  Cognitive Reloading
An alternative way of reloading the problem of scientific 
discovery is the cognitive approach, and in particular a main 
branch of it: the computational approach.
This approach, incepted by Simon and Newell, draws 
upon several features of Poincaré’s account of scientific 
discovery, as it aims at providing an “examination of the 
phenomena of incubation and illumination and their expla-
nation” (Simon 1977, 292). This theory of discovery argues 
for the so-called nothing special view, “which proposes 
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ordinary cognitive processes, such as those involved in our 
day-to-day problem-solving activities” (Weisberg 2006, xii).
Thus the cognitive approach sees scientific discovery as a 
problem-solving activity and it “does not assign any special 
role to the unconscious—or, for that matter, to the conscious. 
It assumes, implicitly, that the information processes that 
occur without consciousness of them are of the same kinds 
as the processes of which the thinker is aware” (Simon 1977, 
292). This tenet is essential to develop the most advanced 
version of this approach, a mechanization of scientific 
discovery—conceptual discovery as well as discovery of 
regularities. In effect the cognitive approach argues that the 
processes underlying a scientific discovery are ordinary (not 
special) and can be examined, reconstructed and reproduced 
in a rational way. In addition it argues that “human beings 
should be looked upon as information- processing systems, 
analogous to computers, and that the concepts underlying 
our understanding of the functioning of computers could 
be applied to understanding human cognition” (Weisberg 
2006, 119–120).
The practical outcome of it is the BACON software pack-
age (Simon et al. 1987), a kind of ‘mechanical discoverer’. 
Simon provides us with several examples of historical sci-
entific discovery that can be obtained by BACON, such as 
Kepler’s third law. Fed with data on the periods of revolution 
(P) and the distances (D) of the planets from the sun, the 
program runs the following recursive heuristic rules:
i.) if two variables co-vary, introduce their ratio as a new 
variable;
ii.) if they vary inversely, introduce their product as a new 
variable and check if it is constant.
The iteration of these two simple rules is enough to obtain 
Kepler’s third law in a purely mechanical way (see Simon 
et al. 1987, 68–81). In a similar way, Simon shows us how 
it is possible to account in purely computational terms for 
many scientific discoveries, such as Boyle’s law, Ohm’s law, 
the Law of Uniform Acceleration, Coulomb’s law, and the 
ideal-gas law. Moreover, Simon argues that BACON would 
be able to generate also new properties (concepts), for 
instance ‘gravitational mass’ (Simon et al. 1987, 155–156).
In this way the cognitive approach provides us with an 
answer to scientific discovery based on a rational account of 
it: it acknowledges that the solution provided by the deduc-
tive approach is untenable, while providing us with a better 
method and a theory of problems, and it shows us how infer-
ences and simple heuristics shape the process of generation 
of hypotheses.
But while acknowledging the merits of this approach, one 
cannot ignore all its weaknesses and the fact that this idea of 
a mechanical discoverer appears untenable (see in particular 
Nickles 1980a; Kantorovich 1993, Gillies 1996; Weisberg 
2006; Ippoliti 2017a).
In effect BACON is capable of doing, at most, only a spe-
cific part of the discovery, and in a sense the (most) trivial 
one.
First of all, BACON cannot perform a crucial step in the 
generation of a hypothesis: the identification of relevant 
variable and data. They are chosen and provided by the pro-
grammers: the software simply runs its heuristics over them. 
This means that the real problem that BACON solves is 
simply the estimation of two parameters from a set of data. 
It provides us with an alternative solution to this elementary 
problem and it does not discover a new generalization.
Second, BACON suffers the same weakness of the deduc-
tive approach: it is a reconstruction of a historical process. 
As such, it benefits from the knowledge of a ‘backward 
look’—the advantage of knowing that something is a prob-
lem, that its data can be approached by certain heuristics, 
and that the problem is solvable. Thus, at most, we can say 
that this software discovers in a new solution to a solved 
problem.
Third and even more important, it lacks the fundamental 
capability of producing a really new concept or property, or 
better to build a conceptualization that is required to solve 
and pose problems. Just like any software, it helps and 
boosts human beings in computational tasks such as finding 
regularities and making calculations.4
2.3  Evolutionary Reloading
An alternative way of reloading the problem of scientific dis-
covery is the evolutionary one. This approach draws on the 
evolutionary epistemology and on an explicit analogy with 
biology, namely “the metaphor of an organism as a prob-
lem-solver” (Kantorovich 1993, 224). Thus, this approach 
is a way of naturalizing the process of discovery, that is, to 
explain it without assuming supernatural (in the sense of 
not being part of natural world) entities or events (such as 
genius).
Tellingly, while this view connects scientific discovery 
to evolution, it denies not only the possibility of a logic, or 
also a method, for discovery, but even the possibility of a 
rational approach to its core—the generation of hypotheses.
In particular this view makes use of the mechanism 
of evolutionary process, namely the processes of blind 
4 Simon (Kulkarni and Simon 1988) relaxed the structures of 
BACON in later programs such as KEKADA, which, unlike BACON 
that “was concerned mainly with the ways in which theories could 
be generated from empirical data, with little or no help from theory” 
(Kulkarni and Simon 1988, 140), tries to deal with issues such as the 
question of where the data came from, the processes of designing 
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variations and selective retention (BV + SR), as an explana-
tion for discovery. Such a reading of the process of discovery 
employs a dynamic view, according to which growth of a 
theory can be seen as the growth of an organism: in effect 
“both a research program, and an organism are engaged in 
problem-solving. A research program solves, for instance, 
problems arising from the need for adjusting its basic ideas 
[...] to new observational data. Similarly, an organism adapts 
to new environmental conditions on the basis of its genetic 
makeup” (Ibid.).
In effect the BV + SR mechanisms seem to be “incred-
ibly creative problem solvers” (Nickles 2009, 193) and “bio-
logical evolution can be interpreted, metaphorically, as an 
innovative problem-solving process” (Ibid., 182). One of 
advantages here is the fact that they seem to offer a way to 
get more knowledge from less knowledge: the recombination 
and blind variation of few simple items seems capable of 
producing something (more) complex and articulated.
Two of the main consequences of an evolutionary 
approach to scientific discovery, or better of the idea that 
discovery is a blind variation, are that it cannot be method-
governed and that science has no predetermined goal. These 
two features, of course, are worrying since they seem to sup-
port the thesis that discovery not only is unintentional, but 
also that it happens by ‘chance’. An answer to this objection 
(see e.g. Kantorovich and Ne’eman 1989) is “that the coun-
terpart of blind biological mutation in science be interpreted 
as serendipitous discovery, which means that scientists 
proceed in a methodical or guided way, even though their 
final discovery may solve a problem they had not originally 
intended to solve” (Kantorovich 1994, 19). An outcome of 
this way of modeling scientific discovery is that the human 
mind is the ‘host’ of the process of blind variation and selec-
tive retention and “these processes can be categorized as 
unintentional or involuntary. The incubation process is well 
known, but is not well understood. It can be explained by 
the model of natural selection which is applied to mental 
elements created quasi-randomly in the discoverer’s mind; 
the discoverer hosts the process in his mind, so to speak” 
(Ibid., 20). This idea of our mind as a mere container of 
a combinatorial-selective process enables a surprising ver-
sion of the evolutionary approach, that is a computational 
one, which uses genetic algorithms (see Koza 1992, 1994; 
Koza et al. 1999). In this particular sense, the evolutionary 
approach does defend an idea of a method for discovery, 
even if a limited one. Here rationality is at the beginning 
and at the end of a process, which takes place by combining 
items in random way: humans can set-up the process, wait 
for the outcomes and select one of them. So in this sense, 
against Popper and Campbell, an evolutionary approach 
would not be the antithesis of method and to some degree it 
can methodized.5
Nonetheless, the endpoint of this evolutionary approach 
is hard to defend.
First, the idea that serendipity6 can be used as a general 
model to account for scientific discovery seems untenable 
for at least two reasons—one quantitative and one quali-
tative. On one hand, the discoveries made in that way are 
few, and, at most, they are an epiphenomenon. On the other 
hand, the very notion of ‘discovery by chance’ does not 
explain precisely the cases that it employs to support its 
own view. Fleming, Columbus, or Poincaré, did not discover 
‘by chance’, but the discovery was made after they used a 
lot inferences, strategies, and plans—all rational tools. Of 
course the final product was in a sense unexpected, but it was 
found after many options had been explored and rejected by 
the discoverer or others (e.g. in the case of Poincaré’s math-
ematical discovery), or after several controlled trials (e.g. in 
the case of Fleming’s discovery of penicillin), or simply the 
final discovery was not excluded from the very beginning 
(e.g. Columbus in trying to circumnavigate the earth could 
not exclude that other lands could be encountered).
Second, evolution can be used to support a different and 
more rational account for scientific discovery. In effect, it 
can be argued that evolution shows us that biological pro-
cesses are not simply a kind problem-solving, but inferential 
problem-solving also at a very basic and primitive level (see 
von Helmholtz 1866; Gregory 1970, 1980). Vision would 
provide a stock example in this sense. Following this tra-
dition and its findings, our visual apparatus can be recon-
structed in inferential term, as it continually would make 
hypotheses to solve problems: it is not a camera, but an 
inferential machine (see e.g. Cellucci 2013, 2017a). These 
inferences are ampliative, unconscious, non-propositional 
and built-in by evolutionary adaptation: they processes data 
(light beams) and generate hypotheses using non-deductive 
rules on the base of past experience. So, here there is not a 
neat distinction between generation and justification of a 
hypothesis, as the data to generate and verify a hypothesis 
can be the same. In addition these inferences and hypotheses 
are domain-specific: a change of environment or niche can 
lead them to error.
This way of naturalizing scientific discovery, which 
explicitly connects a method-governed approach to discov-
ery and evolution, changes again our theories of discovery 
and it paves the way for the construction of a variety of 
rational tools and rules to advance knowledge: it harmonizes 
theory and practice of scientific discovery in a new way and 
5 I would like to thank Tom Nickles for a clarification of this point.
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opens the door to a logic of discovery. It initiates a scientific 
discovery revolution.
3  Scientific Discovery Revolutions
This new view on theory and practice of scientific discovery 
has its roots in Lakatos’ work on heuristics (Lakatos 1976) 
but has expanded, revised and improved it a lot.
It borrows from Lakatos’ work and from the several 
reloaded versions of the issue the idea that scientific discov-
ery is problem-solving,7 and argues that it can be accounted 
for in an inferential way. Moreover it reconciles evolution 
and logic, since it argues that the way we discover something 
is by using a kind of reasoning that has been built-in our 
cognitive and biological make-up by adaptation (see Cel-
lucci 2013). This new way of characterizing scientific dis-
covery not only removes the separation between the genera-
tion and the testing of a hypotheses (as heuristic procedures 
play a role also in testing and selecting a hypothesis), but it 
also provides a unifying approach to problem-solving and 
problem-finding.
I will examine its theory of discovery and then I will 
look at the practices suggested by its way of conceptualizing 
scientific discovery.
As concern the former, it maintains that discovery is a 
natural process that has a method, which is bottom-up, and 
a logic with rules. By methods it means simply a means 
to an end, a way of pursuing a certain aim. It is provided 
by a specific version of the analytic method, which offers 
a very general bottom-up framework for solving problems 
(see Cellucci 2013). More precisely, we start looking for a 
hypothesis that is a sufficient condition for solving the prob-
lem—that implies a solution to the problem. This hypothesis 
is obtained from the bottom, i.e. from the problem and pos-
sibly other data already available, by the application of some 
non-deductive rules. The only requirement is that it has to 
be plausible.8 Then the hypothesis undergoes a plausibility 
test and, in positive case, is provisionally accepted. In turn 
this hypothesis is a new problem, which must be solved and 
its solution is sought in the same way.
Of course in order to work, and to produce a logic of 
discovery, this framework must be endowed with proce-
dures for the generation of hypotheses. These procedures 
are non-mechanical, as “the purpose of a logic of discovery 
is not to dispense with the need for intelligence by use of an 
algorithmic method, but rather to expand natural intelligence 
providing it with heuristic means–means capable of guiding 
natural intelligence, albeit not infallibly” (Cellucci 2017a, 
143–144). In more detail, these procedures are heuristic in 
kind, for they do not guarantee a solution of the problem: 
they are ampliative and as such they can lead to erroneous 
conclusions. Nonetheless, they are a genuine way to con-
struct new hypotheses in a rational way.
Here comes the practical, and in some ways more impor-
tant, side of this new conceptualization of scientific discov-
ery. In this sense ‘scientific discovery revolution’ argues that 
we have to stop thinking about a theory of discovery, and 
to concentrate on the investigation of procedures to be used 
to generate new hypotheses to solve problems. The study, 
production and classification of heuristic procedures are the 
frontier of a logic of discovery, and not surprising they have 
been improved a lot recently (see in particular Cellucci 2013 
ch. 20–21; Jaccard and Jacoby 2010; Ippoliti 2017b; Ippoliti 
and Cellucci 2016).
In essence these heuristic procedures are tools for model-
ling the research space of hypotheses—what Simon defines 
the ‘problem-space’. To produce a new hypothesis we have 
to combine ideas and concepts in many ways and this will 
generate a combinatorial explosion in the problem-space. A 
heuristic procedure is a means to handle such a combinato-
rial space: it is a tool to build such a space, as this space 
essentially depends on the existing knowledge and the avail-
able data. Such a space is determined not only (i) by the way 
the data are processed using a heuristics, but also (ii) by the 
way data and the corpus of existing knowledge change over 
time. The application of a heuristic procedure can reduce as 
well as expand a problem-space.
A heuristics can be classified in several ways, start-
ing from the well-known distinction between positive and 
negative heuristics (see Lakatos 1976).9 A further useful 
distinction is the one that tells apart primitive and derived 
heuristics, or generative and selective heuristics (see Ippoliti 
2017b). The primitive are analogies, disanalogies, induc-
tions and their combinations (e.g. analogies between analo-
gies). Any heuristic procedure is a variant, combination or 
juxtaposition of these primitive heuristics, for it presup-
poses them. They enable us to build a more articulated and 
complex (derived) heuristics, e.g. metaphors or scenario-
building. The set of derived heuristics is open, as new rules 
can be produced as new problems are solved, nonetheless 
we can classify them into several classes: inversion heu-
ristics, heuristics of switching, scenario building, thought 
8 Plausible here, following Aristotle’s notion of andoxa, simply 
means that the arguments for the hypothesis are ‘stronger’ (in quality) 
than those against it on the basis of the existing knowledge.
9 A positive heuristics guides us in the construction of admissi-
ble paths during the search of a solution for a problem. A negative 
heuristics prevents us from building certain paths—by blocking the 
modus tollens on a specific part of the theory.
7 This idea goes back to Plato, and Aristotle (see Quarantotto 2017) 
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experiments, the analysis of extreme cases, the analysis of a 
deviant case amongst others (see Jaccard and Jacoby 2010; 
Ippoliti 2017b). For example the heuristics of switching10 is 
based on a specific change of viewpoint, which we get by 
switching from one order of analysis to another one. Thus 
it is based on the study of explicit analogies and disanalo-
gies.11 Moreover these heuristic procedures cover both sides 
of problem-solving, namely to solve and pose problems.12
Thus this new, inferential, approach has revolutionized 
not only the way of theorizing discovery but also, and more 
importantly, the ways of practicing it in a rational and more 
systematic manner. We have now a better, finer-grained 
understanding of methods and toolboxes to use as a guide 
to discover something new. And we can improve them. This 
is a remarkable contribution of philosophy of science to sci-
ence, as it puts the former in a position not only to interpret 
what scientists do, but also to provide and improve tools that 
they can employ in their activity.
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